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TOBACCO IS A THORNY PLANT 
The Common Market is currently in the process of developing 
a new common agricultural policy for tobacco. Considerable 
producer, fiscal, and commercial interests are involved and . 
clash over this issue. Because of the widely divergent interests 
of the Community's member states, a great many difficulties 
still remain, and the July 1, 1968, deadline for implementing a 
tobacco policy has long since passed. However, this March, 
work once again has resumed on the Commission's proposals 
in the Community's Council of Ministers. The final provisions 
of this policy could play a significant role in the future level of 
U.S. exports to the Community which by 1967 ran at about 
$100 million annually. This depends on how the markets open 
up as a result of the policy towards monopolies and to what 
extent the Community's goals of self-sufficiency still serve to 
bar imports while stimulating internal trade and production. 
This issue of the Common Market Farm Report first 
presents the problems facing the Community and then outlines 
the Commission's proposals for a tobacco policy. 
The Problems: Production, Trade, Monopolies, Taxes 
The Community Council of Ministers envisaged a common 
marketing system for tobacco coming into effect on July 1, 
1968. However, the Ministers made one precondition, that 
adequate steps be taken to reorganize the operating conditions 
of state monopolies so that there should be no discrimination 
between member countries in either the buying or selling of 
tobacco and tobacco products. 
Although tobacco cultivation accounts for less than 15 per 
· cent of the Community's revenue from agriculture, it is a crop 
of considerable importance in some areas. Over 90,000 sales 
outlets in France and Italy depend more or less directly on the 
state tobacco monopolies in those two countries. Further-
more, smokers are a favorite target of the revenue authorities 
in all the Community countries - as elsewhere. 
Trade in tobacco products between the Six, however, 
remains small, amounting to only some $50 million a year. 
The importance of tobacco in the Common Market lies in the 
range of problems it raises: agricultural, commercial, monopo-
listic, and fiscal. 
Production Problems 
In formulating a common policy for tobacco, the Community 
has had to take into consideration the differing policies of the 
member states, the interests of domestic tobacco growers, and 
also those of other countries - as Community supplies provide 
only 30 per cent to 40 per cent of total tobacco consumption 
in the Six. The Community's own output, which totals about 
133,000 metric tons of leaf and is worth about $140 million 
annually, comes mainly from France and Italy, though some 
tobacco is also grown in Germany and Belgium. Production 
costs are generally higher than overseas. The common external 
tariff on most imported raw tobacco following the Kennedy 
Round of tariff negotiations is 23 per cent, though with actual 
minimum and maximum specific duties of between 12.7 cents 
and 15 cents per pound. These rates of duty make up for only 
a part of the differences in costs, and fiscal measures and state 
monopolies are additional means of protecting growers. Such 
guarantees cover 88% of all Community tobacco production. 
A common tobacco policy for the Community has to offer 
p reducers guarantees of employment and living standards 
equal to those they now enjoy within the national markets. 
Market intervention will therefore be necessary to guarantee 
growers outlets at reasonable prices for their produce. A major 
question to be decided by the Six is whether the Community 
guarantee for the market should be limited - as for sugar - or 
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unlimited - as in the case of the other important farm 
products. 
When the Common Market was completed last year, all 
remaining inter-member duties and quota restrictions were to 
be removed. Since about 60 per cent of Community tobacco 
needs are imported, a system similar to that for fats and oils 
seems to be required, which would offer growers subsidies 
rather than imposing levies on imports. 
Trade Problems 
Of the 260,000 metric tons of dried or fermented tobacco 
imported into the Community each year, some 43,000 tons 
come from states associated with the Community. The main 
suppliers in 1965 were, in order of importance: the United 
States, Greece, Rhodesia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Argentina, and Tur-
key. Tobacco imports represent more than 4 per cent of all 
agricultural imports. Community exports of raw tobacco 
amount to some 5 ,OOO tons annually. 
The countries associated with the Community have a con-
ception of what the Community's tobacco policy should be 
that is quite different from that of non-associated countries. 
The associated countries, notably Greece, favor a high degree 
of protection which guarantees them a significant degree of 
preference; the non-associated countries obviously prefer the 
lowest tariff possible. Tobacco is one of Greece's most impor-
tant agricultural exports and was the subject of two annexes to 
the Greece-EEC Association Agreement which gave certain 
guarantees for tobacco. In the case of Turkey, a Community 
import quota has been granted at the same tariff rate as Greek 
imports. Madagascar supplies the bulk of the Community's 
tobacco imports from the 18 African states associated with the 
Community under the Yaounde Convention. 
Technical considerations as well as taste dictate that the Six 
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continue to import substantial quantities of tobacco from 
other countries, which are, in fact, their main traditional 
suppliers. The Commission proposed that imports from these 
countries be freed of restrictions and generally not be subject 
to quotas, though a safeguard clause would apply, and though 
it also proposed that the preference for Community and asso- • 
dated countries' producers be maintained. 
Manufactured tobacco imports total about 45 ,OOO metric 
tons. The present protective tariff ranges from 26 per cent ad 
valorem for semi-manufactured products, 52 per cent for ciga-
rillos, and 90 per cent for cigarettes to 117 per cent for pipe 
tobacco. 
Monopoly Problems 
The French state tobacco monopoly dates from 1810, and the 
Italian from 1862. These state boards have powers to intervene 
in the growing of tobacco and have exclusive rights within 
their countries to manufacture, sell, and import tobacco 
products. 
Such monopolies contravene the Common Market Treaty, 
which also provides that rights of establishment in non-wage-
earning activities are open to nations of all Community 
countries under the same conditions as those prevailing for the 
nationals of any member country. As no private French or 
Italian individual may manufacture tobacco, this also means 
that no other Community citizen has the right to set up 
tobacco-manufacturing capacities in France or Italy . If the 
Germans and Benelux countries are to be expected to make 
their contribution to financing the. common tobacco policy, 
they may expect some concessions in this same field. Thus 
tobacco companies in Germany and the Benelux countries 
insist that they be free to establish factories anywhere in the 
Community where they think desirable. 
As for the monopolies' exclusive selling rights in France and • 
Italy, the Commission has already recommended that the 
French and Italian governments gradually open up their mar-
kets to tobacco products from the rest of the Community. The 
two governments have partly changed their policies, and the 
upshot has been a large rise in imports, especially into Italy. 
The retail sale of tobacco goods is in the hands of 40,000 
retailers in Italy and 50,000 in France who have been selected 
by the monopolies after public tenders. In France, advertising 
at the retail level is subject to the control of the monopoly, 
while in Italy tobacco advertising of all kinds has been banned 
since 1962. This measure, introduced for health reasons, obvi-
ously hits imported cigarettes and tobacco more than Italian 
products, whose names are better known to the public. A 
Community policy of tobacco publicity is therefore also called 
for, as well as settling the overall problem of giving equal 
access to tobacco products from throughout the Community. 
There is a lively controversy as to whether this can be done 
without modifying the exclusive rights of the monopolies 
( which are, of course, themselves responsible for selling the 
imported products). 
Fiscal Problems 
In Germany, cigarettes are commonly described as being "tax 
receipts with a little tobacco inside." Throughout the Com-
munity, taxes on tobacco products are high, the actual rates in 
1966 varying from 60 per cent to 80 per cent according to the 
country and the qualities concerned. Tax systems play their 
part, too, in holding down the present level of intra-
Community tobacco trade. In Germany, for example, a mini-
mum selling price tied to a minimum tax rate discourages the 
import of cheap cigarettes, and other fiscal measures encour-
age the production of cigarettes with at least 50 per cent 
home-grown tobacco content. 
• 
• 
Setting the tobacco out to dry. The Common Market Commission has proposed a common agricultural policy for raw tobacco as well as measures 
concerning national monopolies and taxes on manufactured tobacco. 
Commission Proposals tor a Common Tobacco Policy 
In 1967, the European Communities Commission submitted to 
the Council of Ministers three proposals for a Community 
policy for tobacco products as well as a regulation on manu-
factured tobacco grown in the associated states. The proposals, 
closely linked to one another, were for: 
• a common agricultural policy: a regulation for a common 
market organization for unmanufactured tobacco 
• tax harmonization: a regulation on consumption taxes on 
manufactured tobacco other than turnover taxes, and a resolu-
tion on excise taxes on manufactured tobacco 
• national monopolies: a regulation on commercial monopo-
lies in manufactured tobacco 
• a regulation for unmanufactured tobacco grown in the 
eighteen Yaounde states associated with the Community and 
the associated overseas countries and territories. 
Market Organization for Raw Tobacco 
The Commission's proposal for a market organization for raw 
tobacco was basically as follows: 
1. Price System. The Council would fix target and interven-
tion prices each year before August I for the following year's 
harvest. For the first year, intervention prices would be set at a 
level which guaranteed that growers would receive prices 
equivalent to those obtained the previous year plus the aids 
granted during the same year. For each variety of tobacco, the 
basic intervention price would be 90 per cent of the norm, or 
target, price. 
2. Intervention. The intervention agencies would be required 
to purchase at the intervention price all leaf tobacco offered 
by growers, in order to guarantee that Community producers 
might sell at a price that does not vary excessively from the 
target price. 
3. Premiums. In order to encourage the sale of Community 
tobacco on the open market, premiums would be granted to 
purchasers of home grown tobacco. The premium would be 
determined by the difference between the target price and the 
price of imported tobacco from non-member countries. 
4. The tobacco purchased by the intervention agencies and 
which has undergone initial processing, such as baling and 
storing, would be put up for public auction. The lots would be 
sold to the highest bidder, but the price would not fall below a 
minimum based on world prices and would be at a level that 
ensured Community producers a preference over imported 
products. 
The minimum price level could not fall below 85 per cent of 
the average of similar imported wrapped tobaccos. Growers 
would have the option, therefore, of selling on the open mar-
ket or to the intervention agency at the intervention price. 
5. Imports from non-member countries would be subject only 
to the duties listed in the common external tariff (CET). How-
ever , a safeguard clause would enable the Community to adopt 
measures if the Community's market were seriously disturbed. 
Refunds would be provided for in certain cases to encourage 
exports. 
6. An 85 per cent CET cut and a pro rata reduction in charges 
were proposed for imports from the Community's associated 
states and territories. 
7. Customs duties and quotas on intra-Community trade 
would be abolished when the regulation comes into force. 
National regulations on the culture and marketing of tobacco 
would also be withdrawn. 
8. The remaining provisions of the draft regulation were much 
the same as those for other existing market organizations, and 
the cost of the various measures would be financed by the 
European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund. 
Harmonization of Excise Duties on Manufactured Tobacco 
Intra-Community trade in manufactured tobacco has not made 
much progress to date, the Commission found . Apart from 
certain natural factors, such as differences in smokers' tastes 
and habits, the main obstacles have been laws that artifically 
hamper trade among the member states, in particular , the 
differences between member states' regulations governing 
excise duties on manufactured tobacco. The Commission has 
proposed the establishment of a harmonized excise structure 
for tobacco products; later, the harmonization of structures 
would have to be supplemented by measures to eliminate tax 
frontiers. 
The proposed harmonization would be based on the follow-
ing principles : 
1. Taxes would be based on retail selling prices inclusive of 
customs duties. 
Selling prices would be fixed freely by manufacturers 
according to market conditions. Where one or more com-
ponents of the selling price are determined by official regula-
tions, the regulations would have to be consonant with sound 
competition. 
2. The actual rates could be freely determined by each mem-
ber state, but within any given state, the rate should be the 
same for all categories of products belonging to a single group 
of manufactured tobacco. 
3. Normally, the rates within each member state would be a 
percentage of price. However, if very high proportional rates 
were applied, it would give rise to differences in the prices of 
the various classes of products belonging to a single group of 
manufactured tobacco and nullify competition between the 
different classes. 
To make the system as impartial as possible, the Com-
mission's proposals for excise taxes on cigarettes provided for 
a specific rate of duty (minimum tax but without a minimum 
price system) up to a certain level of retail selling prices, fol-
lowed by a pro rata duty up to a higher level above which a 
degressive scale would finally become applicable. Those retail 
selling prices at which the minimum duty gave way to the pro 
rata duty and the pro rata duty to the degressive rate would be 
determined on the basis of Community criteria. 
Excise duty was also to be degressive for the other groups of 
manufactured tobacco once the duty rate exceeded a given 
level. 
4. The excise duty would be levied by means of price bands. 
Each member state would allow foreign producers, on condi-
tion that due precautions are taken against fraud, to purchase 
price bands for the products they export to a particular mem-
ber state. This would facilitate intra-Community trade and 
reduce the disadvantages of the tax frontiers until they are 
abolished. For each group of manufactured tobacco, the mem-
ber states would be free to fix a scale of retail selling prices for 
which the price bands would be available. As the object of 
each scale would be to facilitate the collection of excise duty, 
it would have to reflect clearly the diversity of the products 
offered to the consumers of each country. 
Adjustment of Monopolies 
A genuinely free manufactured tobacco market cannot be 
established unless the following objectives are obtained: 
• the free movement of manufactured products 
• the abolition of all discrimination, at distribution or retail 
level, in one member state against another country from which 
it imports goods 
• the removal of any regulations directly or indirectly favor-
ing the sale of home-manufactured products to the detriment 
of other member states' products 
The aims of the proposed measures would be to: 
• make possible the import and sale of manufactured tobacco 
of other member states, irrespective of brands and quantities, 
in relation to demand 
• ensure that distribution arrangements did not discriminate 
against foreign Community products 
• ensure that arrangements for fixing selling prices obviated 
any discrimination between home-grown and imported 
products 
• ensure that national manufacturing departments cease to 
collect taxes. These departments would be subject to the tax 
system applying to manufacturing companies. Their balance-
sheets should disclose manufacturing costs, and should there-
fore be published 
• ensure that producers in other member states were allowed 
to circularize tobacconists and advertise on the same terms as 
domestic producers. Tobacconists would be free to advise their 
customers of all their Community wares on an equal basis 
since advertisement of domestic tobacco goods and that of 
manufactured tobacco supplied by other member states would 
be st:tbject to the same rules. 
By January 1, 1970, a second series of measures would have 
to be adopted by the member states running monopolies. The 
following principles would be applied: 
• In these member states, manufactured tobacco supplied by 
the other member states would be imported directly without • 
their first passing through the monopoly distribution depart-
ment. Suppliers of manufactured tobaccos would be allowed 
to organize their own wholesale distribution network and to 
maintain stocks in the importing country. 
• The tobacconists' independence from the state would be 
ensured. They would be allowed to procure supplies, of what-
ever quantity or quality, directly from suppliers established in 
the other member states. 
• Advertising regulations applying to domestic and imported 
tobacco goods would be drawn up. 
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